The Buddhist assertion of the possibility of introspection as a form of metacognition raises the interesting problem of whether or not it is possible for the mind to observe itself. Buddhists generally assert that at any given moment consciousness and its concomitant mental processes have the same intentional object; and at any given moment only one consciousness can be produced in single individual. Moreover, a famous discourse attributed to the Buddha declares that the mind cannot observe itself, just as a sword cannot cut itself and a fingertip cannot touch itself; nor can the mind be seen in external sense objects or in the sense organs. I suspect the rationale behind that assertion is that even when one is aware of one’s own subjective experience of an object, there is still a sense of separateness between the observer of that experience and the experience itself. The sense of duality remains. Within the context of ordinary, dualistic cognition, there can be no subjective awareness that has no object, just as there can be no object without reference to a subject that cognizes or designates that object. According to Tibetan Buddhist philosohy, subject and object are mutually interdependent. All phenomena experienced as subjects and objects arise within, and in dependence upon, the conceptual framework in which they are designated.
When one observes one’s own subjective experience of an object, the observer seems to be distinct from that experience; and if one takes note of that observer, there remains a sense of duality between the noted observer and the one who notes that observer. This hypothesis of an observer perceiving a simultaneously existing observer perceiving a simultaneously existing observer leads to an infinite regress. The eighth-century Indian Buddhist contemplative ntideva, avoids this problem by suggesting that instead of such meta cognition occurring with respect to a simultaneously existing cognition, one is rather recollecting past moments of consciousness. In short, he hypothesizes that it is possible to recollect a subjective experience that was not previously cognized as a distinct, isolated entity. In his view, when one remembers seeing a certain event, one recalls both the perceived event and oneself perceiving that event. The subject and object are recalled as an integrated, experienced event, from which the subject is retrospectively identified as such; but he denies that it is possible for a single cognition to take itself as its own object.
To take an example, when one’s attention is focused on the color blue, one is not observing one’s perception of that color. However, when one’s interest shifts to the experience of blue, one is in fact recalling seeing that color just a moment ago. In this process, one conceptually and retrospectively isolates the subjective element from the remembered experienced event, in which the blue and one’s experience of it were integrated. Thus, when the attention is shifted
back and forth between attending to the color and to remembering seeing the color, it seems as if such a shift is comparable to shifting the attention from the objects at the center of consciousness to those at the periphery; but according to ntideva, the attention is instead shifted from the perceived object to a short term recollection of a previous event. And in remembering that event, the subject is isolated and recalled, even though it was not its own object at the time of its own occurrence. When one is recalling a perception of an earlier event, there is still a sense of duality between oneself and the perception that one is recalling. A single cognition does not perceive itself, so the subject/object duality is sustained.
When one observes one’s own subjective experience of an object, the observer seems to be distinct from that experience; and if one takes note of that observer, there remains a sense of duality between the noted observer and the one who notes that observer. This hypothesis of an observer perceiving a simultaneously existing observer perceiving a simultaneously existing observer leads to an infinite regress. The eighth-century Indian Buddhist contemplative ntideva, avoids this problem by suggesting that instead of such meta cognition occurring with respect to a simultaneously existing cognition, one is rather recollecting past moments of consciousness. In short, he hypothesizes that it is possible to recollect a subjective experience that was not previously cognized as a distinct, isolated entity. In his view, when one remembers seeing a certain event, one recalls both the perceived event and oneself perceiving that event. The subject and object are recalled as an integrated, experienced event, from which the subject is retrospectively identified as such; but he denies that it is possible for a single cognition to take itself as its own object.
To take an example, when one’s attention is focused on the color blue, one is not observing one’s perception of that color. However, when one’s interest shifts to the experience of blue, one is in fact recalling seeing that color just a moment ago. In this process, one conceptually and retrospectively isolates the subjective element from the remembered experienced event, in which the blue and one’s experience of it were integrated. Thus, when the attention is shifted
back and forth between attending to the color and to remembering seeing the color, it seems as if such a shift is comparable to shifting the attention from the objects at the center of consciousness to those at the periphery; but according to ntideva, the attention is instead shifted from the perceived object to a short term recollection of a previous event. And in remembering that event, the subject is isolated and recalled, even though it was not its own object at the time of its own occurrence. When one is recalling a perception of an earlier event, there is still a sense of duality between oneself and the perception that one is recalling. A single cognition does not perceive itself, so the subject/object duality is sustained.
